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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analytically and empirically investigates the linkage between labor costs and a firm’s 
income volatility, equity risk, and cost of capital. While the relationship between labor costs and 
the firm’s cost of capital under uncertainty conditions is important, there has been little research 
examining this issue. While we control for fixed labor costs, we focus on labor flexibility effects as 
the U.S. temporary staffing sales for 2005 totaled $69.5 billion, 8.5% more than in the previous 
year (American Staffing Association, 2007). Within the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
framework, we demonstrate analytically and empirically that labor flexibility reduces income 
volatility, equity risk and cost of capital in the service industry. However, we find that labor 
leverage has no impact on income volatility, and increases equity risk and cost of equity capital. 
These results suggest that managers can structure labor costs to minimize the firm’s risk and 
maximize shareholder value.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
ithin the context of the standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the primary purpose of this paper 
is to demonstrate the theoretical linkage between labor costs and a firm’s income volatility, equity risk, 
and cost of equity capital. The relationship between equity risk and factors in a firm’s uncertain 
economic environment is a subject of contemporary concern especially in these current turbulent economic times. 
How can firms better cope with economic uncertainty? Many articles have appeared in the literature that attempt to 
link equity risk to elements of the product and factor markets faced by the firm, in the framework of the Sharpe 
(1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) CAPM. The most relevant to the analytical analyses of the present study 
are Conine (1982), Subrahmanyam and Thomadakis (1980), Callahan and Mohr (1989), Lord and Beranek (1999), 
Rosett (2001; 2003), and more recently Hong and Sarkar (2007). While little academic research has been conducted 
on the relation between labor costs and equity risk, Rosett (2001; 2003) are notable exceptions. In contrast to 
Rosett’s work, which focuses on fixed labor stock, in this study we analytically and empirically investigate the 
linkage between labor costs and a firm’s income volatility, equity risk, and cost of equity capital. Our analytical and 
empirical results demonstrate that labor flexibility reduces income volatility, equity risk and cost of capital in the 
service industry noted for the high propensity of labor costs.  However, we find that labor leverage has no impact on 
income volatility, and increases equity risk and cost of equity capital in the service industry. 
 
 Labor costs are a significant fundamental production input cost (Freeland et al., 1979).
1
 Understanding the 
effects of this primary production cost, labor, on a firm’s risk structure and cost of equity capital is important. We 
focus our work on the concept of labor flexibility. Labor economists generally define labor flexibility as the ease or 
difficulty with which firms can modify the size and composition of their workforce in response to the changing 
economic environment. The practice of labor flexibility includes all aspects of contingent labor, such as temporary 
layoffs, greater reliance on casual, contractual, temporary or part-time workers, and contracting out employment.   
 
W 
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 The popular press reports many examples of firms using flexible labor to manage risk and uncertainty. For 
example, currently, 15 to 20 percent of the workforce in most large companies—including Sun Microsystems, 
Hewlett Packard, Cisco Systems, and other technology firms—comes from contingent labor sources (Sims, 2000). 
U.S. contractors in the construction industry use contingent labor to respond to changes in demand (Phillips, 2003). 
AT&T uses Resource Link, an internal labor pool that supplies AT&T’s business units with labor on an as-needed 
basis, to meet uncertainty and reduce risk (Meadows, 1994). 
 
On the academic side, there have been few studies investigating the linkage between labor costs and the 
cost of capital.  Studies in the management science literature show that utilizing one concept of labor flexibility, 
specifically, the degree of variable compensation, reduces demand uncertainty, labor supply uncertainty, and equity 
risk (Bloom and Milkovich, 1998; Clinton, 1997; Milner and Pinker, 2001; Pinker and Larson, 2003; Stroh et al., 
1996). More specifically, Milner and Pinker (2001) and Pinker and Larson (2003) develop mathematical 
optimization models of the interaction between firms and labor supply agencies when demand and supply are 
uncertain and study how each affects the contingent labor supply or the nature of the contracts formed. In departure 
from these studies, and more closely related to the current research, Rosett (2001; 2003) empirically demonstrates 
that labor leverage, a proxy for the present value of obligated future labor costs, is positively associated with a firm’s 
equity risk.  
 
We extend Rosett (2001; 2003) by incorporating labor flexibility, an additional labor cost variable that 
measures the degree of variable labor costs. While Rosett focuses on the linkage between labor leverage and equity 
risk, we build a more complete model of the effects of labor costs on the firm’s cost of equity capital by linking our 
labor flexibility analysis to income volatility and the firm’s cost of equity capital.   In our analytical analyses, we use 
an income statement decomposition approach to link labor flexibility and labor leverage to the operating and 
financing risk of the firm. That is, within the context of the standard CAPM of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and 
Mossin (1966) and following the seminal analytical efforts of Hamada (1972), Rubinstein (1973), Lev (1974) and 
Conine (1982), we directly link labor costs to equity risk.  
 
 To test the validity of our analytical models, we use the service industry for our empirical analysis. In the 
present study, the selection of service industries was motivated by a desire to obtain high variance in labor cost 
conditions. This variation is germane to understanding fully the impact of labor costs on our measures of equity risk. 
Services lie at the hub of economic activity in the United States. Service jobs account for almost 80 percent of total 
U.S. employment. As such, we say that the U.S. has a service economy. We suggest that the service industry 
represents a unique setting for our tests as service is the result of applying human labor or mechanical efforts to 
people or objects. Services are intangible products involving a performance, or an effort that cannot be physically 
possessed. Schmenner (1986; 1995) provides a framework for understanding services and utilizing them 
strategically, by specifically considering labor intensity and labor costs. Throughout the economy, especially in 
services, firms rely more and more upon external contract workers to fill key positions that were once considered the 
exclusive purview of full-time permanent workers (Milner and Pinker 2001). 
 
Hence, labor costs and labor flexibility in the service industry are economically important in the firm’s cost 
structure. 
 
In the service industry, our empirical analyses are consistent with our analytical results. That is, our study 
finds a differential analytical financial market effect for labor flexibility and labor leverage. Although not previously 
examined in the literature, we find that labor flexibility reduces income volatility, equity risk and cost of equity 
capital, while labor leverage increases equity risk and cost of capital. These results have useful implications for 
managers who wish to use labor flexibility to manage the firm’s risk and maximize shareholder value. For investors, 
knowledge of these labor effects will improve the prediction of ex ante risk and investment decisions. 
 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the analytical models and theoretical observations. 
Section III presents the empirical analysis and results. The conclusions are discussed in Section IV. 
 
 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – September/October 2010 Volume 26, Number 5 
47 
2. THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
Studying the linkage between labor markets and financial markets can enhance our understanding 
(Lindenberg and Ross, 1981). In studying the underlying causes of systematic risk in the financial markets, 
Campbell et al. (2009) conclude that underlying cash flow fundamentals have a dominant influence on systematic 
risk. Labor costs represent a fundamental production input cost impacting cash flows and hence should impact 
systematic risk. 
 
While there are many different types of labor costs or employee compensation,
2
 in general, an employee’s 
compensation consists of two primary labor cost components: (1) fixed salary, and (2) at-risk (variable) 
compensation (associated with variable compensation plans (VCP)), (Abdel-khalik, 2003; Gaynor and Anderson, 
1995). This dichotomization is useful for examining the effects of labor costs on income volatility, equity risk, and 
cost of capital.  
 
In the following analysis, labor leverage and labor flexibility measure these two primary labor components. 
Recall that labor leverage measures fixed labor stock, the present value of obligated future labor compensation costs 
(Rosett, 2001; 2003), while labor flexibility, measures an employers’ ability to vary quantities of labor and 
compensation in the current period. Labor flexibility is an important issue as America’s staffing companies 
employed an average of 2.96 million temporary and contract workers per day in 2006—more than in any other 
year—according to the American Staffing Association quarterly employment and sales survey (2007), yet we know 
little about the effects of labor flexibility on the value of the firm. To address this important economic issue, we 
begin our investigation by formulating an analytical model. 
 
 The theoretically derived model presented in this section develops clear relationships between (1) labor 
flexibility, income volatility, equity risk and the cost of capital and (2) labor leverage, equity risk, and the cost of 
capital. We analytically show that labor flexibility reduces income volatility, equity risk and cost of capital. 
However, we demonstrate that labor leverage has no impact on income volatility, and increases equity risk and cost 
of equity capital.  
 
Relationship between Labor Flexibility, Labor Leverage and Income Volatility  
 
 Graham et al. (2005) find that an overwhelming majority of CFOs (97%) prefer to report non-volatile 
(smooth) earnings, holding cash flows constant. The main reasons offered by survey participants for their preference 
for smooth earnings are the investors’ perception of lower risk, and the lower cost of equity and debt. However, 
prior research has not reached a consensus on whether income volatility garbles information for equity market 
participants with a resultant impact on market metrics such as risk and the cost of capital. While some researchers 
(e.g., Sankar and Subramanyam (2001), and Demski (1998)) argue that dampening income volatility is informative, 
other studies, regulators, and anecdotal evidence (e.g., Leuz et al., 2003; Levitt, 1998; Lang et al., 2003; and 
Bhattacharya et al., 2003), suggest that income volatility is non-informative and should not impact the perception of 
equity risk in the capital market. We begin our analysis and approach to this issue by linking income volatility to 
labor flexibility and labor leverage, the subject of this paper. 
 
 Rubinstein (1973) and Lev (1974)
3
 both developed theoretical models of systematic risk allowing for 
stochastic demand and we follow this seminal approach. We begin by defining a firm’s before-tax earnings (X) for a 
single period as: 
 
X R VC FC    (1) 
   
Where: 
 
X = before tax earnings 
R = total revenues (sales) 
VC = total variable costs, which are a function of the number of units sold (q). 
FC = total fixed costs, which are unaffected by volume changes. 
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We make two changes to the before-tax earnings equation to isolate variable (VCL) and fixed (FCL) labor 
costs since this study focuses on labor costs. First, we decompose total variable cost (VC) into all variable costs 
except variable labor costs (VC-VCL) and variable labor costs (VCL). Second, we divide total fixed cost (FC) into all 
fixed costs except fixed labor (FC-FCL) and fixed salaries (FCL). 
 
VCL FCLX R VC VCL FC FCL       (2) 
 
 Consistent with Lev (1974) and others, we consider the effect of demand (q) fluctuations on income 
volatility. The effect of demand fluctuations on earnings can be examined by rewriting Equation (2) as: 
 
u u VCL u FCLX SP q VC q VCL q FC FCL       (3) 
 
Where:  
 
SPu = sales price per unit 
VCu-VCL = variable costs per unit excluding variable labor costs per unit 
VCLu = variable labor cost per unit 
q = quantity (total units produced and sold) 
 
 Equation (3) is then differentiated with respect to q. Because fixed costs are independent of changes in 
demand, they do not appear in the differentiated equation. Differentiating Equation (3) with respect to q assumes 
that demand uncertainty is the only factor affecting income volatility. In other words, prices do not change 
independent of changes in quantity. Similar to Lev (1974), if perfectly competitive output ([dSPu / dq] = 0) and input 
([dVCu-VCL / dq] = 0; [dVCLu / dq] = 0) markets are assumed, the differentiation of Equation (3) with respect to q 
becomes: 
 
 u u u VCLdX SP VCL VC dq      (4) 
 
Equation (4) demonstrates that variable labor costs per unit (VCLu) reduce the effect of demand fluctuations 
(dq) on income volatility (dX). Ceteris paribus, an increase in variable labor costs per unit, i.e., labor flexibility, 
decreases income volatility. 
 
 Next, the assumption of a perfectly competitive variable labor input market ([dVCLu / dq] = 0) is relaxed. 
An increase in the demand for variable labor causes a rightward shift of the demand curve resulting in an increase in 
equilibrium quantity and an increase in equilibrium price ([dVCLu / dq] > 0) if the firm is facing an upward sloping 
variable labor supply curve. Modifying Equation (4) yields: 
 
  uu u VCL u
dVCL
dX SP VC VCL q dq
dq

  
      
  
      (5) 
 
Equation (5) shows that variable labor costs buffer changes in earnings from changes in demand in two 
ways. First, the variable cost of labor per unit (VCLu) reduces the effect of demand uncertainty (dq) on income 
volatility (dX). Second, assuming a firm faces an upward sloping variable labor supply curve (a tenable economic 
assumption) ([dVCLu / dq] > 0), changes in the variable cost of labor per unit with respect to changes in quantity will 
also reduce the effect of demand fluctuations on income volatility. 
 
There are two key implications that may be drawn from Equation (5). First, Equation (5) shows that 
variable labor costs (VCLu) reduce income volatility (dX) due to demand uncertainty (dq). Second, fixed 
compensation (FCL) is unaffected by changes in quantity and has no effect on income volatility due to demand 
uncertainty. Therefore, fixed compensation (FCL) cannot be used to buffer income volatility from the effects of 
demand uncertainty. 
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Relationship between Labor Flexibility, Labor Leverage and Equity Risk 
 
Given the established income volatility effects, we next examine the impact of labor costs on equity risk to 
make the linkage to the firm’s cost of capital. By assuming a direct relationship between accounting net income and 
security returns Lev (1974) derives Equation (6): 
 
 (1 )U UU U
U
U U
X gcg d
R
MVE MVE
 
   (6) 
 
Where: 
 
RU = unlevered firm returns 
cgU = capital gains  
dU = dividends  
XU = before tax earnings 
 = corporate tax rate 
MVEU = market value of equity for an unlevered firm 
gU = change in the capitalized growth rate 
 
We can define the relationship between firm returns (RL) and unlevered firm returns (RU) using a similar 
approach to Hamada (1972). 
 
1 LL U
L
D
R R
MVE
 
  
 
 (7) 
 
Where: 
 
RL = return of a levered firm 
RU = return of an unlevered firm 
DL = market value of debt for a levered firm 
MVEL = market value of equity for a levered firm 
 
 Substituting Equation (6) into Equation (7) for unlevered firm returns (RU) yields Equation (8): 
 
 (1 )
1
U U L
L
U L
X g D
R
MVE MVE
    
   
  
 (8) 
 
Two modifications are made to Equation (8) to investigate the relationship between labor flexibility, labor 
leverage and equity risk. First, total liabilities (DL) are decomposed into debt excluding labor leverage (DL-LL) and an 
off-balance sheet labor leverage liability (LL) consistent with Rosett (2001; 2003). Labor leverage risk is analogous 
to financial leverage risk. 
 
L L LLD D LL   (9) 
 
Where: 
 
DL = total debt of a levered firm 
DL-LL = total debt of a levered firm excluding labor leverage 
LL = labor leverage 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – September/October 2010 Volume 26, Number 5 
50 
Equation (9) is substituted for DL in Equation (8). Second, assuming a direct relation between net income 
and security returns,
4
 the decomposition of before-tax earnings (X) in Equation (3) is substituted for the before-tax 
earnings of an unlevered firm (XU) in Equation (8). Incorporating these two changes into Equation (8) results in 
Equation (10). 
  
 ( )(1 )
1
u u VCL u FCL U L LL
L
U L L
SP q VC q VCL q FC FCL g D LL
R
MVE MVE MVE
              
    
(10) 
 
Equation (10) is then differentiated with respect to q. In addition to assuming perfectly competitive output 
([dSPu / dq] = 0) and input ([dVCu-VCL / dq] = 0; [dVCLu / dq] = 0) markets, we use the assumptions of a constant tax 
rate (dτ/dq = 0) and constant change in growth rate (dΔgU/dq = 0) to simplify the resulting derivative. Because initial 
invested resources are unchanged by changes in quantity ([dMVEU/dq] = 0; [dMVEL/dq] = 0; [dDL-LL/dq] = 0; 
[dLL/dq] = 0), the differentiation of Equation (10) with respect to q becomes: 
 
 ( ) (1 )
1
u u VCL u U L LL
L
U L L
SP VC VCL D LL
dR dq
MVE MVE MVE
          
  
 (11) 
 
 Equation (11) demonstrates that variable labor costs per unit (VCLu) reduce the effect of demand 
fluctuations (dq) on return volatility (dRL). Ceteris paribus, an increase in variable labor costs per unit, i.e., labor 
flexibility, decreases return volatility. However, labor leverage (LL) increases the effect of demand fluctuations (dq) 
on return volatility (dRL). The equity risk results for labor leverage and labor flexibility also extend to a firm’s 
systematic risk. 
 
 Analytical studies demonstrating that financial risk directly influences systematic risk began with Hamada 
(1972) and have been extended by several analytical papers.
5
 Equation (12) presents a Hamada (1972)-Lev (1974) 
beta decomposition. Appendix A contains details of this beta decomposition. 
 
2 2
cov(( (1 )) / , ) cov(( ) / , )
1
M M
U U M U U M L
L
R R L
X MVE R g MVE R D
MVE


 
   
     
  
      (12) 
  
We can draw two key conclusions from Equation (12).
6
 First, income volatility (measured by the 
covariance of after-tax income deflated by equity with market returns) increases equity risk. Second, financial 
leverage (measured by the debt-to-equity ratio) increases equity risk. This provides a good foundation for an 
analytical investigation of the effects of labor leverage and labor flexibility on equity risk. 
 
Similar to the equity risk decomposition, two modifications are made to Equation (12) to investigate the 
relationship between labor flexibility, labor leverage and equity risk. First, we substitute the decomposition of total 
liabilities (DL-LL + LL) in Equation (9) for DL in Equation (12). Second, the decomposition of before-tax earnings (X) 
in Equation (2) is modified by incorporating total contribution margin before variable labor costs (CM-VCL = R - VC-
VCL).  
 
VCL FCLX CM VCL FC FCL      (13) 
 
Assuming a direct relation between net income and security returns,
7
 Equation (13) is then substituted for 
the before-tax earnings of an unlevered firm (XU) in Equation (12). Incorporating these two changes into Equation 
(12) results in Equation (14).  
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cov((( (1 )) / , ) cov((( ) (1 )) / , ) cov(( ) / , )
2 2 2
1
)
M M M
VCL U U M U U M U U M
L
R R R
L LL
L L
CM MVE R VCL MVE R g MVE R
D
MVE MVE
LL
 

  


  
 

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     (14) 
 
We draw two key conclusions from Equation (14). First, ceteris paribus,
8
 labor flexibility (VCL) is 
inversely related to equity risk (βL). The middle covariance term, the covariance between after-tax variable labor 
costs deflated by equity and the market return, reduces systematic risk. An increase in the level (expected value) of 
variable labor costs increases the covariance with the market return and reduces systematic risk. Second, labor 
leverage (LL) is positively associated with equity risk. Increases in labor leverage increase a firm’s total liabilities 
and financial risk (the last term in Equation (14)).
9
 This increases a firm’s systematic risk.10 These risk effects of 
labor leverage and labor flexibility should extend to a firm’s cost of capital.  
 
Work started by Rubinstein (1973) and extended by Callahan (1985), Callahan and Mohr (1989), and Lord 
and Beranek (1999) decomposed operating risk (the first right-hand side term in Equation (14)) into four factors: 1) 
unit operating margin, 2) the value of equity, 3) the complement of the firm’s average income tax rate, and 4) 
demand beta (the covariance of firm unit output with returns on the market portfolio). Our work decomposes 
operating risk into three components: operating margin before labor costs, labor costs, and a change in capitalized 
growth rate. In addition, our work adds to the work of Lee et al. (1990) and Peyser (1994). They examine the risk 
effects of the capital intensity (capital-labor ratio) in a firm’s production function. Our work examines the risk 
effects of labor characteristics not just the risk effects of the labor amount relative to capital. 
 
Relationship between Equity Risk and the Cost of Equity Capital 
 
 Systematic risk as we have modeled in the analytics is the market risk or the risk that cannot be diversified 
away, as opposed to ―idiosyncratic risk,‖ which is specific to individual stocks. Even if we have a perfectly 
diversified portfolio there is some risk that we cannot avoid and this is widely accepted as systematic risk. There is a 
large body of finance and accounting research showing a positive relation between systematic or equity risk and a 
firm’s cost of capital beginning with the well-known Sharpe-Lintner CAPM that demonstrates that a firm’s cost of 
equity capital is a positive function of its systematic risk (Lintner, 1965; Sharpe, 1964). Our analytical results show 
that labor flexibility and labor leverage affect systematic risk, and therefore will also affect the firm’s ex ante cost of 
capital. By deduction, labor flexibility is inversely related to the cost of capital. And labor leverage is directly related 
to the cost of capital. 
 
In sum, the overall conclusion of our analytical analysis is that labor costs affect a firm’s operating 
characteristics, equity risk and cost of capital. We have shown analytically that variable labor costs or labor 
flexibility reduces income volatility due to demand uncertainty effects. Second, fixed labor costs or labor leverage is 
unaffected by changes in demand and has no effect on income volatility. To make our linkage to the cost of equity 
clear, our analytical analyses show that labor flexibility is inversely related to equity risk, while labor leverage is 
positively associated with equity risk. Finally, given the equity risk effects, the impact of labor leverage and labor 
flexibility extend to a firm’s cost of capital. Our analyses of labor costs advance our understanding of the risk-
generating process operating in capital markets.
11
  
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Methodology 
 
To empirically test the validity of our analytical models, we use the service industry
12
 over the sample 
period from 1960 – 2004. In the present study, the selection of service industries was motivated by a desire to use an 
industry sector where labor costs are economically important. The services sector offers several advantages for our 
investigation. The services sector is labor intensive. In addition, the services sector has no inventory to buffer 
production and production input costs like labor from demand volatility.  
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Sample data are collected from three sources: COMPUSTAT (financial information to calculate labor 
flexibility, labor leverage, the income volatility measure, and other financial data), CRSP (stock return information 
to calculate the standard deviation of returns and beta), and I/B/E/S (analysts’ earnings forecast information to 
calculate the cost of capital estimate). All monetary values are denominated in millions. Employee data are 
denominated in thousands. The sample period runs from 1960 – 2004. We begin with 22,038 initial COMPUSTAT 
service sector observations (observations with labor and employee data). These were matched with CRSP-supplied 
standard deviation of returns data leaving 7,259 observations. We further restrict the sample by retaining only 
observations with all information required for the primary regressions. This leaves 698 useable observations. Next, 
we truncate all major variables to remove the extreme 1% tails of the distributions. This minimizes the effect of any 
errors that might create extreme outliers in regressions. The final services sector sample contains 561 observations. 
 
Table 1 presents selected descriptive statistics of this study’s main variables. 
 
 
Table 1---Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Mean Standard Deviation 
SD(Et-4,t) Standard Deviation of Earnings 70.427 186.851 
SD(rCRSP)  Standard Deviation of CRSP Returns 0.029 0.016 
E(r)  Cost of Capital 0.109 0.031 
Labor Labor Leverage 0.028 0.042 
LaborFlex Labor Flexibility 0.581 0.339 
MV Log market value 5.765 2.008 
Leverage Debt/(Market Value + Debt) 0.423 0.229 
IOS Investment Opportunity Set 0.693 0.262 
Sales Log sales 5.886 1.726 
E/V Financing Policy 0.577 0.229 
Β Beta 0.749 0.527 
BtM Book-to-Market ratio 0.544 0.418 
Notes: The lowest and highest 1% of the distribution was removed from each continuous variable in this study. Only December 
fiscal year-end firms are included in the analysis. All dollar-valued items are deflated to year 2000 prices using the GDP deflator. 
The standard deviation of earnings (SD(Et-4,t)) is the standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes (C170 + C15) using 
five annual earnings observations for years t-4 through t. The standard deviation of returns (SD(rCRSP)) is calculated by CRSP for 
calendar years using daily raw returns. CRSP requires trades on at least 80% of trading days to calculate a SD(rCRSP). The cost of 
capital (E(r)) is calculated using the Easton (2004) model. The cost of capital is a function of current period price (P0) and one-
year and two-year earnings forecasts (eps1, eps2): 
 
0 1 0 2
0
( ) ( )
( )
E eps E eps
E r
P

  
 
Labor Leverage is defined as Total Employment/MVE, or Compustat items C29/[C25*C199]. Labor Flexibility follows a similar 
cost structure decomposition process used by Lev (1974). It is based on firm-by-firm estimates of α1 from time-series regressions 
of Labor = α0 + α1*EBITL + ε using the current and four lagged annual observations. In this context, we define EBITL = C170 + 
C15 + C42 and Labor = C42. Log market value is the natural log of the market value (C25*C199) at the end of the fiscal year. 
Leverage (Leverage) is the book value of debt (C6 – C60) divided by debt plus the market value of equity (C6 – C60 + 
C25*C199) both at the end of the fiscal year. The Investment Opportunity Set follows the definition of Smith and Watts (1992). 
They use the ratio of book value of assets to firm value, or [Book Value of Assets]/[Market Value of Equity + Total Assets – Book 
Value of Equity]. This is measured using Compustat items C6/[(C25*C199)+C6-C60]. Log Sales follows the definition of Smith 
and Watts (1992). This is measured as ln(C12) where C12 is valued using year 2000 prices. Financing policy (E/V) follows the 
definition of Smith and Watts (1992). They use the ratio of market value of equity to firm value, or [Market Value of 
Equity]/[Market Value of Equity + Total Assets – Book Value of Equity] or Compustat items [C25*C199/(C25*C199+C6-C60)]. 
Beta (β) is calculated by CRSP for calendar years using daily raw returns. CRSP requires trades on at least 50% of trading days to 
calculate β. The book-to-market ratio is the book value of equity (C60) divided by the market value of equity (C25*C199). 
 
 
We use three dependent firm performance variables. Similar to Kothari et al. (2002), the standard deviation 
of realized earnings for five years proxies for income volatility. Similar to Rosett (2003), the standard deviation of 
returns taken from CRSP serves as a market-based equity risk measure.
13
 Finally, we use the Easton (2004) model to 
calculate an implied cost of capital estimate.  
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We use two independent labor variables of interest in our tests. Consistent with Rosett (2003), labor 
leverage is defined as employees divided by market value of equity (C29 / [C25 * C199])
14
 and is used as a proxy 
for labor stock. Labor flexibility is the regression coefficient from regressing total labor costs on earnings before 
interest, taxes and labor costs (EBITL).
15
 Regression analysis is a popular cost estimation technique. However, like 
any cost estimation technique, it is based on assumptions. The two key assumptions in the regression equation below 
are: 1) the labor costs only depend on one activity, i.e., EBITL dollars, and 2) the relation between labor costs and 
EBITL is linear. 
 
1it i i it itLabor LF EBITL     (15) 
 
Where:  
 
Laborit = total labor compensation for firm i in year t (C42), 
EBITLit = earnings before interest, taxes and labor costs (C170 + C15 + C42) for firm i in year t. 
LFit = Proxy for the flexibility in a firm’s labor costs calculated as the regression coefficient from regressing total 
labor costs (C42) on EBITL (C170 + C15 + C42) using the current year (t) and four prior years (to t-4) (five total 
years) of data for firm i. 
 
Other control variables used in our expanded models include the following:  
 
Log market value is the natural log of the market value (C25*C199) at the end of the fiscal year. 
 
Leverage is the book value of debt (C6 – C60) divided by debt plus the market value of equity (C6 – C60 + 
C25*C199) both at the end of the fiscal year.  
 
The Investment Opportunity Set follows the definition of Smith and Watts (1992). They use the ratio of book value 
of assets to firm value (C6/[(C25*C199)+C6-C60]).  
 
Log sales follows the definition of Smith and Watts (1992). This is measured as the natural log of sales (C12). 
 
Financing policy (E/V) follows the definition of Smith and Watts (1992). They use the ratio of market value of 
equity to firm value (C25*C199/(C25*C199+C6-C60)).  
 
Beta (β) is calculated by CRSP for calendar years using daily raw returns. CRSP requires trades on at least 50% of 
trading days to calculate β.  
 
The book-to-market ratio is the book value of equity (C60) divided by the market value of equity (C25*C199). 
 
Results 
 
 Income volatility, equity risk, and cost of capital variables are regressed on labor flexibility and labor 
leverage to test the analytical hypotheses. Two models are used for each market measure and income volatility: 1) a 
base model containing labor flexibility and labor leverage as independent variables, and 2) an expanded model 
containing labor flexibility, labor leverage and control variables. We report pooled regression results, standardized 
coefficient responses, and t-statistics based on White (1980) corrected standard errors similar to Rosett (2003). 
 
Table 2 presents the income volatility model results. Labor flexibility is the only labor proxy used in the 
income volatility models since there was no hypothesized analytical relationship between labor leverage and income 
volatility. Panel A contains the base model results; Panel B provides the expanded model results. 
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Table 2---Income Volatility Pooled Regression Results 
Regressions of income volatility measure, the standard deviation of earnings, on labor flexibility, a labor-based proxy. Other 
controls include: the natural log of market value which serves as a proxy for risk and a control for size; leverage which controls 
for financial leverage. Reported coefficients, except for the intercept, are standardized responses. t-statistics are calculated using 
robust standard errors (White, 1980).  
 
Panel A: Income Volatility Base Model 
Model:  
4, 1 4,( )t t t tSD E LaborFlex error      
Variable Description Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept Intercept 137.899 6.05 
LaborFlex Labor Flexibility -0.211 -3.93 
Adjusted R2  4.27%  
n  561  
 
Panel B: Income Volatility Expanded Model 
Model:  
1, 5 1 2 3 4,( )t t t tSD E LaborFlex MV Leverage error           
Variable Description Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept Intercept -210.759 -6.80 
LaborFlex Labor Flexibility -0.277 -5.74 
MV Log market value 0.560 8.93 
Leverage Debt/(Market Value + Debt) 0.201 5.15 
Adjusted R2  33.48%  
n   561  
Notes: The lowest and highest 1% of the distribution was removed from each continuous variable in this study. Only December 
fiscal year-end firms are included in the analysis. All dollar-valued items are deflated to year 2000 prices using the GDP deflator. 
The standard deviation of earnings (SD(Et-4,t)) is the standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes (C170 + C15) using 
five annual earnings observations for years t-4 through t. Labor Flexibility follows a similar cost structure decomposition process 
used by Lev (1974). It is based on firm-by-firm estimates of α1 from time-series regressions of Labor = α0 + α1*EBITL + ε using 
the current and four lagged annual observations. In this context, we define EBITL = C170 + C15 + C42 and Labor = C42. Log 
market value is the natural log of the market value (C25*C199) at the end of the fiscal year. Leverage (Leverage) is the book 
value of debt (C6 – C60) divided by debt plus the market value of equity (C6 – C60 + C25*C199) both at the end of the fiscal 
year. 
 
 
Labor flexibility is strongly negatively associated with the standard deviation of earnings in both the base 
and expanded models. The expanded model includes size and leverage variables, common control variables used in 
other income volatility models (Kothari et al., 2002). Taken as a whole, the empirical results support the analytical 
conclusion that labor flexibility reduces income volatility. 
 
Table 3 presents the equity risk model results. Panel A contains the base model results; Panel B provides 
the expanded model results. 
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Table 3: Market-based Risk Measure Pooled Regression Results 
Regressions of market-based equity risk measure, the standard deviation of returns, on labor leverage, a labor-based risk proxy, 
and labor flexibility, a labor-based proxy. Other controls include: a financing policy proxy; the natural log of sales which serves 
as a proxy for risk and a control for size; and an investment opportunity set proxy. Reported coefficients, except for the intercept, 
are standardized responses. t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors (White, 1980). 
 
Panel A: Market-based Risk Measure Base Model 
Model:   0 1 2CRSPSD r Labor LaborFlex        
Variable Description Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept Intercept 0.034 21.69 
Labor Labor Leverage 0.214 4.14 
LaborFlex Labor Flexibility -0.269 -5.22 
Adjusted R2  8.61%  
n  561  
 
Panel B: Market-based Risk Measure Expanded Model 
Model:   0 1 2 3 4 5CRSP
E
SD r Labor LaborFlex Sales IOS
V
              
Variable Description Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept Intercept 0.059 7.67 
Labor Labor Leverage 0.154 3.00 
LaborFlex Labor Flexibility -0.207 -4.51 
E/V Financing Policy -0.154 -1.90 
Sales Log sales -0.313 -6.88 
IOS Investment Opportunity Set -0.069 -0.83 
Adjusted R2  16.95%  
n   561  
Notes: The lowest and highest 1% of the distribution was removed from each continuous variable in this study. Only December 
fiscal year-end firms are included in the analysis. All dollar-valued items are deflated to year 2000 prices using the GDP deflator. 
The standard deviation of returns (SD(rCRSP)) is calculated by CRSP for calendar years using daily raw returns. CRSP requires 
trades on at least 80% of trading days to calculate a SD(rCRSP). Labor Leverage is defined as Total Employment/MVE, or 
Compustat items C29/[C25*C199] and is in year 2000 prices. Labor Flexibility follows a similar cost structure decomposition 
process used by Lev (1974). It is based on firm-by-firm estimates of α1 from time-series regressions of Labor = α0 + α1*EBITL + 
ε using the current and four lagged annual observations. In this context, we define EBITL = C170 + C15 + C42 and Labor = 
C42. Financing policy (E/V) follows the definition of Smith and Watts (1992). They use the ratio of market value of equity to 
firm value, or [Market Value of Equity]/[Market Value of Equity + Total Assets – Book Value of Equity] or Compustat items 
[C25*C199/(C25*C199+C6-C60)]. Log Sales follows the definition of Smith and Watts (1992). This is measured as ln(C12) 
where C12 is valued using year 2000 prices. The Investment Opportunity Set follows the definition of Smith and Watts (1992). 
They use the ratio of book value of assets to firm value, or [Book Value of Assets]/[Market Value of Equity + Total Assets – Book 
Value of Equity]. This is measured using Compustat items C6/[(C25*C199)+C6-C60].  
 
 
Labor leverage is strongly positively associated with the standard deviation of returns in both the base and 
expanded models. Labor flexibility, on the other hand, is strongly negatively associated with the standard deviation 
of returns in both the base and expanded models. The base model has an R
2
 of 8.61%. The expanded model adds 
controls for size, financing policy, and investment opportunities (Rosett, 2003) resulting in an increased R
2
 of 
16.95%. The equity risk model empirical results support the analytical conclusions that while labor leverage 
increases equity risk, labor flexibility reduces equity risk. 
 
Table 4 presents the cost of capital model results. Panel A contains the base model results; Panel B 
provides the expanded model results. 
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Table 4: Cost of Capital Pooled Regression Results 
Regressions of estimated cost of capital measure on labor flexibility, a labor-based proxy. Other controls include: beta; the 
natural log of market value which serves as a proxy for risk and a control for size; and the book-to-market ratio. Reported 
coefficients, except for the intercept, are standardized responses. t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors (White, 
1980).  
 
Panel A: Cost of Capital Base Model 
Model:  
1 2 3 4 5 6( )E r Labor LaborFlex MV BtM               
Variable Description Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept Intercept 0.123 20.78 
Labor Labor Leverage 0.344 4.12 
LaborFlex Labor Flexibility -0.291 -3.75 
Adjusted R2  13.93%  
n  212  
 
Panel B: Cost of Capital Expanded Model 
Model:  
1 2 3 4 5 6( )E r Labor LaborFlex MV BtM               
 
Variable Description Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept Intercept 0.169 13.12 
Labor Labor Leverage 0.167 1.97 
LaborFlex Labor Flexibility -0.258 -3.95 
β Beta 0.159 2.94 
MV Log market value -0.400 -5.25 
BtM Book-to-Market ratio 0.086 0.84 
Adjusted R2  29.45%  
n   212  
Notes: The lowest and highest 1% of the distribution was removed from each continuous variable in this study. Only December 
fiscal year-end firms are included in the analysis. All dollar-valued items are deflated to year 2000 prices using the GDP deflator. 
The cost of capital (E(r)) is calculated using the Easton (2004) model. The cost of capital is a function of current period price (P0) 
and one-year and two-year earnings forecasts (eps1, eps2): 
 
0 1 0 2
0
( ) ( )
( )
E eps E eps
E r
P

  
 
Labor Leverage is defined as Total Employment/MVE, or Compustat items C29/[C25*C199] and is in year 2000 prices. Labor 
Flexibility follows a similar cost structure decomposition process used by Lev (1974). It is based on firm-by-firm estimates of α1 
from time-series regressions of Labor = α0 + α1*EBITL + ε using the current and four lagged annual observations. In this context, 
we define EBITL = C170 + C15 + C42 and Labor = C42. Beta (β) is calculated by CRSP for calendar years using daily raw 
returns. CRSP requires trades on at least 50% of trading days to calculate β. Log market value is the natural log of the market 
value (C25*C199) at the end of the fiscal year. The book-to-market ratio is the book value of equity (C60) divided by the market 
value of equity (C25*C199). 
 
 
Labor leverage is strongly positively associated with the implied cost of capital in both the base and 
expanded models. Labor flexibility, on the other hand, is strongly negatively associated with the implied cost of 
capital in both the base and expanded models. The base model has an R
2
 of 13.93%. The expanded model adds 
controls for size, systematic risk, and the book-to-market ratio resulting in an increased R
2
 of 29.45%. The equity 
risk model empirical results support the analytical conclusions that while labor leverage increases the cost of capital, 
labor flexibility reduces the cost of capital. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper analytically and empirically investigates the linkage between labor costs and a firm’s income 
volatility, equity risk, and cost of capital. The contribution of this work is an explicit consideration of labor costs in 
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the decomposition of equity risk. While we consider labor leverage (fixed labor cost), we add to the literature by 
considering labor flexibility which measures the relative level of variable compensation in a firm’s labor cost 
structure. To test the validity of our analytical models, we use the service industry over the sample period from  
1960 – 2004 for our empirical tests. We find that our empirical analyses are consistent with our analytical results. 
That is, our study finds a differential analytical capital market effect for labor flexibility and labor leverage. We find 
that labor flexibility reduces income volatility, equity risk and cost of equity capital, while labor leverage increases 
equity risk and cost of capital. 
 
 Understanding the linkage between labor flexibility costs and the firm’s income volatility, equity risk, and 
cost of equity capital is important. The U.S. staffing industry in America's work force is changing. Many people are 
looking for flexibility in their employment arrangements, yet we know little about the impact of this phenomenon on 
firm value. This paper has provided some evidence that there is a linkage between labor flexibility and the cost of 
equity capital and hence, firm value; however other research studies are needed. Future research can extend the work 
in this study in two ways. First, the analytical conclusions developed here can be rigorously tested empirically in 
other aspects of the firm’s operating and financing environment.   Second, future work can begin to examine the 
integration between productivity effects and risk effects of labor costs.  
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APPENDIX A 
Relationship between Financial Risk, Income and Equity Risk 
 
 Integrating Hamada (1972) and Lev (1974) analytically shows that beta, a measure of a firm’s systematic 
risk, is a function of income volatility and financial risk.
16
 
 
 Hamada (1972) shows that a firm’s systematic equity risk (βL) is a function of a firm’s operating risk (βU) 
and financing risk (DL / MVEL). U represents an estimate of the firm’s operating (business) risk while the debt-to-
equity ratio approximates financial risk. Hamada (1972) demonstrates that as a firm’s financial risk increases (debt-
to-equity ratio increases), the firm’s levered beta also increases.  
 
1 LL U
L
D
MVE
 
 
  
 
 (A1) 
   
Where: 
 
L = beta of a levered firm 
U = beta of an unlevered firm 
DL = market value of debt for a levered firm 
MVEL = market value of equity for a levered firm 
 
Incorporating Lev (1974) into Equation (A1) establishes the relationship between systematic risk and 
income volatility. Lev (1974) decomposes unlevered beta by combining equations (A2) and (A3). First, based on the 
CAPM, unlevered systematic risk is defined as follows: 
 
2
),cov(
MR
MU
U
RR

   (A2) 
 
Where: 
 
RU = unlevered firm returns 
RM = market returns 
 
Next, by assuming a direct relationship between accounting net income and security returns, Lev (1974) 
obtains Equation (A3):
17
 
 
 (1 )U UU U
U
U U
X gcg d
R
MVE MVE
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   (A3) 
 
Where: 
 
RU = unlevered firm returns 
cgU = capital gains  
dU = dividends  
XU = before tax earnings 
 = corporate tax rate 
MVEU = market value of equity for an unlevered firm 
gU = change in the capitalized growth rate 
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Equation (A3) is substituted for RU in Equation (A2). After this substitution, the newly modified Equation 
(A2) is then substituted into Equation (A1) for U. The result of these substitutions is Equation (A4):  
 
2
cov(( (1 ) ) / , )
1
M
U U U M L
L
R L
X g MVE R D
MVE



    
    
  
 (A4) 
  
Equation (A5) decomposes the covariance of firm returns with the market return into two parts: 1) the 
covariance of after-tax income deflated by market value of equity with the market return and 2) the covariance of the 
change in the capitalized growth rate deflated by market value of equity with the market return. 
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Where: 
 
L = beta of a levered firm 
RM = market returns  
XU = before tax earnings 
 = corporate tax rate 
MVEU = market value of equity for an unlevered firm 
gU = change in the capitalized growth rate 
DL = market value of debt for a levered firm 
MVEL = market value of equity for a levered firm 
 
The systematic risk effect of income volatility is now isolated in the first term on the right-hand side of 
Equation (A5).  
 
                                                 
ENDNOTES: 
 
1
 For example, Blinder estimates that labor accounts for at least 70% of total costs in his book on labor practices in 
the U.S., Paying for Productivity (1990). 
2
 For example, in addition to salaried employees, there are several flexible employment arrangements like part-time 
employees, temporary employees, temporary agency workers, employees whose hours vary from week to week, 
employees on annual hours contracts, and flextime employees (Casey et al., 1997). 
3
 As we do, a number of studies use Lev (1974) as a starting point to build on and extend his initial work. For 
example, Chung and Charoenwong (1991) find that growth opportunities increase uncertainty and systematic risk 
extending the literature examining the risk effects of firm operating characteristics. Whereas Lev (1974) assumes 
that only quantity is stochastic, Conine (1982) derives a beta decomposition that allows both price and quantity to be 
stochastic and mutually dependent. In addition, Conine (1983) demonstrates the relationship between beta and the 
constant price elasticity of demand. Building on the work examining the effects of stochastic prices on beta, 
Subrahmanyam and Thomadakis (1980) show that factor mix and price affect systematic risk. They also find that 
beta is a decreasing function of operating leverage—a result that contradicts Lev (1974). 
4
 Note that this assumption is consistent with the assumptions in Lev (1974) and was also used in to derive Equation 
(6). 
5
 A number of studies have extended Hamada’s initial work. Conine (1980a; 1980b) extend Hamada (1972) by 
investigating the effects of risky debt and risky preferred stock on systematic risk. Ehrhardt and Shrieves (1995) 
consider the effects of warrants and convertible securities. Hite (1977), Alberts and Hite (1983), and Lally (2002) 
use the Modigliani and Miller (1958; 1963) model to investigate the effects of financial leverage on systematic risk, 
firm profits, and the market risk premium. Lally (2004) incorporates Hamada (1972) into the Fama and French 
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(1997) model to relate the Fama and French sensitivity coefficients to a firm’s leverage. This study adds to this body 
of literature by examining how labor costs and labor leverage in particular affects financing risk. 
6
 Note that Equation (12) assumes that operating risk and financial risk are independent of each other. Therefore 
Equation (12) shows only the direct effects of operating risk and financing risk on beta and does not show indirect 
off-setting effects of operating risk and financial risk (Hite, 1977). 
7
 Note that this assumption is consistent with the assumptions in Lev (1974) and was also used to derive Equation 
(6) and in Appendix A to derive Equation (A3). 
8
 Note that this ceteris paribus assumption means, among other things, that the change in capitalized growth is 
unaffected by differences in the mix of fixed and variable labor costs. 
9
 This analytical result is also consistent with the operationalizations of labor leverage in Rosett (2003). Rosett 
(2003) uses labor cost and number of employees to proxy for the present value of future labor costs and then deflates 
these values by the market value of equity to calculate labor cost leverage and labor leverage respectively. These 
operationalizations are similar to our analytical results. 
10
 Rosett (2003) presents analytical equations that demonstrate the positive relationship between labor leverage and 
systematic risk. While our conclusions are the same, our analytical equations differ. 
11
 An extensive body of research investigates the performance and productivity effects of various flexible forms of 
compensation: 1) forms of variable incentive compensation (Banker et al., 2000; Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002), and 2) 
forms of contingent or temporary labor (Nayar and Willinger, 2001). However, little work has considered the effects 
of labor flexibility on equity risk. 
12
 We use Barth et al.’s (1998) services sector classification. Barth et al. (1998) classify the following SIC codes in 
the services sector: 7000-7369 and 7380-8999. 
13
 Although β is a noisier measure of firm risk due to estimation inefficiencies noted by Christie (2000) and others, 
our results are qualitatively similar when β is used as a market-based risk proxy. 
14
 C represents the COMPUSTAT data item number. 
15
 Note that this approach of regressing total labor costs on EBITL (a proxy for the quantity of production) is similar 
to the approach that Lev (1974) used by regressing total costs on sales to estimate a firm’s total variable costs. 
16
 Several studies build on the early work of Hamada (1972) and Lev (1974) and integrate the effects of operating 
and financing risk. For example, Mandelker and Rhee (1984) examine the joint impact of operating and financial 
leverage and find that operating and financial leverage magnify the intrinsic business risk of common stock. Rhee 
(1986) decomposes beta into a business risk component, an operating risk component and a financing risk 
component. Rhee (1986) uses this decomposition to reconcile Subrahanyam and Thomadakis (1980) with Lev 
(1974). Rhee (1986) also decomposes the cost of capital into a business risk premium, operating risk premium, and 
financial risk premium. 
17
 Note that Equation (A3) is identical to Equation (6) in the body of the paper where it was also used in the equity 
risk decomposition. 
